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The ageing of population is often referred to as a major determinant of the future
evolution of health care expenditures. Indeed, at the individual level, health care
expenditures is an increasing function of age. As life expectancy keeps improving
in developed countries, the likely growing proportion of elderly people should lead
mechanically to an accelerated growth of total health care expenditures.
The consequences of ageing is an issue addressed by numerous macro and micro-
economic papers. At the macro-economic level, the vast majority of studies ﬁnd
out that the age structure of a country is not signiﬁcant in a regression explaining
the level of total health care expenditures, whereas factors like total GDP or level
of education are highly signiﬁcant [1 ¡ 8]. At the individual level, micro-economic
studies ﬁnd out as well that ageing (represented by the individual’s calendar age) has
a negligible inﬂuence on individual health care expenditures, as long as proximity to
death is taken into account [1, 2, 3].
According to Zweifel et al. [1], the correlation observed between age and health
care expenditures would be spurious. Actually, it would result from the fact that
the probability of death increases with age, together with the high cost of dying
(for Medicare, payments per person-year for decedents are 7 times larger than for
survivors ; in France, the corresponding coeﬃcient is equal to 5). Following this
analysis, individual health care expenditures would in fact depend exclusively on
proximity to death, and not on age.
These ﬁndings are likely to explain the lack of impact of ageing at the macro
level. As stated by Stearns and Norton [4] on the basis of microsimulations, pre-
dictions failing to take proximity to death into account might even be misleading,









































8The eﬀect of ageing on health care expenditures is usually thought as resulting
from the combination of two phenomena : the ageing of population (graph 1) and
the fact that health care expenditures increase with age (graph 2A1).
Graph 1 : The age structure of the French population, years 1992 and 2000 - Source : Eco-Sante










































8Graph 2A : The health care expenditures proﬁle by age, year 1992
Most projections of future health care expenditures available to date simulate
the impact of ageing simply by applying demographic previsions to the observed
expenditure proﬁle. However, changes in health care expenditure level also depend
on changes over time in the proﬁle by age group. Graph 2B presents these proﬁles
computed for the years 1992 and 2000. A sizeable drift can be observed for people
aged 40 and over. It is strongly increasing with age. This drift can be linked to
changes in patients’ behavior, in physicians’ practices, as well as to technological
progress. As we will see later, it cannot be linked to changes in the health condition
of patients, since our data show that they are in better shape with time.
Consequently, the increase in total health care expenditures in France can be
explained by three distinct factors : (i) the purely demographic eﬀect (namely, the
increase in the proportion of elderly people, given that health expenditure is an
increasing function of age) ; (ii) the changes in morbidity at a given age ; (iii)









































8progress). The aim of this paper is basically to disentangle, evaluate and interpret
the respective eﬀects of these three factors. If the technological progress hypothesis
were to explain most of the rise in health care costs, it would reﬂect a collective
choice towards allocating more health care to the elderly, coupled with improved
technical feasibility.
We make use of micro data in order to evaluate the compared eﬀects of these
demographic changes and proﬁle drifts. As we will see in the results, the eﬀect of
the proﬁle drifts is by far much larger than the eﬀect of demographic changes.
As for the proﬁle drift, we use microsimulation techniques in order to identify
its components over the period 1992-2000. More precisely, we evaluate the respec-
tive inﬂuences of changes in morbidity and changes in practices, for a given level of
morbidity. Our results show that changes in morbidity induce a downward drift of
the health care expenditures proﬁle, whereas the drift due to changes in practices is
upward and sizeable.
Once having disentangled these various eﬀects, we apply our microsimulations to
the age structure of the French population in order to ﬁnally evaluate, for the period
1992-2000, the eﬀects of demographic changes and proﬁle drifts. At this macroe-
conomic level, the rise in health care expenditures due to demographic changes is
very small, in comparison with the eﬀects of the changes in practices. For total
expenditures, we ﬁnd that the impact of changes in practices is 4.6 times larger
than the rise in health care expenditures due to demographic changes. Considering
a broader deﬁnition of changes in practices (including other changes), we ﬁnd that
their impact is even 6.4 times larger than the rise in health care expenditures due
to demographic changes.
In comparison with studies concentrated on time to death [2, 3, 1], our database









































8is an indicator of death proximity, but also about several other morbidity indica-
tors. Furthermore, rather than studying only hospital expenditures, like Seshamani
et al. [2, 3] or aggregate individual expenditures, like Zweifel et al. [1], our dataset
allows us to study the diﬀerent components of individual health care expenditures:
home and oﬃce physician visits, pharmaceutical expenditures submitted to reim-
bursement, and hospital expenditures. Such a detailed analysis let us account for
the very diﬀerent nature of these various kinds of expenditures. For example, phar-
maceutical and hospital costs are very much inﬂuenced by technological progress,
unlike physician visits.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the French
health care system and discuss the access to care of the elderly. Then, we present the
sample and variables (section 3) and the basic features of the data (section 4). The
empirical approach is presented in section 5 and the results in section 6. In section
7, we use microsimulations in order to evaluate the respective impact of ageing and









































8Graph 2B : health care expenditures proﬁles by age groups in years 1992 and 2000
2 The French health care system: the access to
care of the elderly
2.1 The public health insurance
In France, about 99% of the population is covered by the universal public health
insurance system, which covers about 70% of individual health care expenditures.
The remaining 30% (co-payment) can be covered, partially or totally, by private
supplementary coverage, subscribed on a voluntary basis or oﬀered by the employer.
Over the 1992-2000 period, 80% of the population was covered by such a supple-
mentary coverage.
In France, ambulatory care is mainly provided by private (self-employed) physicians.
Hospital care is provided by public hospitals (2/3 of stays) or private hospitals (not-









































8payments for ambulatory care and services provided in private hospitals. Physicians
are salaried when working in public hospitals, which are ﬁnanced by a global budget.
French insured citizens have free access to care ; indeed, the cost of home and oﬃce
visits is covered without frequency restriction. Not only are visits and hospitaliza-
tion covered, but also prescriptions, including drugs. This contrasts strongly with
Medicare. Indeed, this insurance scheme, which concerns retired people aged 65 and
over in the US, does not cover prescribed drugs for ambulatory care.
In France, the same public health insurance system covers both retired and active
people, making no diﬀerence between them. This is another diﬀerence with the US
health care system, where universal public health care insurance is available only for
people aged 65 and over and for low-income disabled individuals.
The French elderly are well covered. Therefore, they do not face ﬁnancial constraints
which could limit their access to health care. In addition, since they have been well
covered their whole life before turning 65, there is no reason why health care expen-
ditures should rise at this age (this rise can indeed be observed in the US, where
people can delay care until they become eligible for Medicare). On the whole, cov-
erage is continuous over the lifetime. It is thus unlikely to inﬂuence the proﬁle of
health expenditures by age group2.
2.2 The pharmaceutical prescriptions
As for drugs, any innovation is submitted ﬁrst to authorization and then to possible
coverage by the public health insurance. There is a bargaining between pharmaceu-
tical ﬁrms and the health insurance administration in order to determine the level of
coverage and set the price of the new medicine. In France, the levels of drug prices
2A small eﬀect of coverage can be seen because the coverage by supplementary insurance has
extended recently and is not equal to 80% for the oldest individuals of the population. Therefore,
together with the future ageing of population, a rise will be observed in the average coverage, which









































8are slightly lower than in comparable developed countries. In addition, since the
ﬁxed price is in general not adjusted afterwards, the price index for drugs is decreas-
ing. However, at the global level, the overall value of drug prescriptions is growing
rapidly because of the rising prices of innovations newly allowed on the market. On
the whole, whereas the total number of physicians’ visits increased by 18% between
1992 and 2000, the total pharmaceutical expenditures increased by 59% in volume
[6].
2.3 The case of the elderly
As stated above, elderly people are covered just like everyone else. As everyone has
free access to care, at low ﬁnancial cost, behaviors can be subject to what is called
”moral hazard”. A characteristic of the period we are interested in is the modiﬁ-
cation of the medical practices and recommendations, notably concerning the aged.
We think particularly of the development of cholesterolemia medication recommen-
dations for the oldest old, or of the prodigious development of cataract surgery, now
occurring at very early stages of the illness : between 1993 and 1999, the number
of cataract surgeries increased by 44% [7]. These procedures might indeed lead to
higher costs, but to considerably better well-being for the elderly.
3 Sample and variables
3.1 The survey
We make use of a micro-economic data set concerning 3265 insured French citizens
for the year 1992 and 4804 for the year 2000. This data set results from a survey
(SPS, i.e. Sant´ e Protection Sociale) conducted by IRDES 3 on a subsample drawn
3Formerly CREDES, Research and Information Center for Health Economics, 10, rue Vauve-









































8from administrative data4 provided by the French public health insurance, which
records every health expenditure submitted to reimbursement.
The sample gives us reliable information about each individual’s health care
expenditures, social protection (existence of supplementary insurance coverage),
morbidity and socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. age, social and occupational
group, net income). The sample is exclusively composed of people living in regular
households. Therefore, our study does not cover the ﬁeld of long-term care, which
essentially concerns people living in institutions.
3.2 The measure of health care expenditures
The survey provides detailed information about the structure of every individual’s
health care expenditures. We will focus on three subgroups of expenditures : physi-
cian home and oﬃce visits, pharmaceutical expenditures related to ambulatory care,
and hospital expenditures. In order to make health care expenditures comparable
between the two years 1992 and 2000, we had to deﬂate the expenditures of the
year 2000, and convert all values to Euros. The deﬂation coeﬃcient5 is speciﬁc to
the type of expenditure of interest and reﬂects the evolution of its price index. Be-
tween 1992 and 2000, the computed price index of physician home and oﬃce visits
rose by 9.15%, reﬂecting the changes in fee levels, which are mostly regulated. The
price index of ambulatory pharmaceutical expenditures rose by 2.04%, of course not
reﬂecting the price of innovations, which are not included in this index. The price
index of hospital expenditures rose by 16.54%. As the pharmaceutical expenditures
price index, it does not include technological progress. Indeed, it is computed on
the basis of the costs of health services (combination of the index of civil servants’
wages and the price index of regular goods).
Therefore, deﬂating the 2000 expenditures simply led to a compensation of the gen-
4EPAS (i.e. Echantillon Permanent d’Assur´ es Sociaux), recorded by the French public health
insurance of employed workers (CNAMTS), which covers about 83% of the population [5]









































8eral inﬂation rate. The growth of deﬂated health care expenditures we want to
analyse is still inﬂuenced by the pace of technological progress, which we are pre-
cisely interested in.
3.3 The measure of morbidity
The survey provides information about several indicators of morbidity. We observe
for each individual his or her number of pathologies, level of invalidity and level
of vital risk. These indicators are detailed in appendix A. The exogeneity of these
individual morbidity indicators in our models might seem questionable. Indeed,
we will use them as explanatory variables of the use of health care services. Since
these indicators result from answers of the individual to the survey, they are af-
fected by subjective appreciation and may be correlated with individual unobserved
heterogeneity. Notice, however, that physicians check the survey and correct for dis-
crepancies between objective information (e.g., type of medication taken) and health
status declaration. Furthermore, previous studies having used the same dataset have
shown that the hypothesis of exogeneity of these indicators cannot be rejected [8].
We will thus consider them as acceptable measures of individual health condition.
4 Basic features of the data
4.1 Descriptive analysis
In this subsection we describe the sample we are working on. The basic features
of the sample are presented in Table 1. In the following subsection, we show that
the changes in the distribution of morbidity levels conﬁrm that health is globally
improving. Then, graphs representing the changes in the levels of expenditures,
conditionally and unconditionally on participation, coupled with the changes in par-
ticipation rate, clearly show the interest of analysing separately the three kinds of











































Average age 34,11 34,01
% women 54,14% 50,55%
Average number of pathologies per individual 3,29 3,23
Average HCE per capita (current FF) 3674,58 5152,39
Participation rate 85,88% 91,96%
- The structure of HCE -
HCE studied (% of total HCE) 84,04% 88,08%
Proportion of physicians’ expenditures in studied HCE 47,91% 42,92%
Proportion of pharmaceutical expenditures in studied HCE 33,77% 35,99%
Proportion of hospital expenditures in studied HCE 18,31% 21,08%
Rise in physician expenditures (1992-2000) 12,81%
Rise in pharmaceutical expenditures (1992-2000) 43,52%
Rise in hospital expenditures (1992-2000) 35,73%
Total rise in mean HCE studied (1992-2000) 27,38%
Of which :
Contribution of physician expenditures 6,14%
Contribution of pharmaceutical expenditures 14,70%
Contribution of hospital expenditures 6,54%









































84.1.1 Changes in morbidity between 1992 and 2000
As we saw on Graph 1, the French population has gradually been ageing between
1992 and 2000. But health condition is slightly improving : graphs 3 and 4 present
the distributions of vital risk and invalidity levels for people aged 50 and older for
both years. It appears clearly that the proportion of people having high levels of
morbidity is dropping6.
Graph 3 : Distribution of the level of vital risk by year, people 50 and more









































8Graph 4 : Distribution of the level of invalidity by year, people 50 and more
4.1.2 Proﬁles by age of conditional health expenditures
Graphs 5A, 5B and 5C display the average health care expenditures by age group
for the years 1992 and 2000, for each kind of expenditure we are interested in. We
present here the conditional mean, i.e. the mean computed over the individuals who
actually used health care services. These graphs show the health care expenditures
proﬁle and its changes between 1992 and 2000.
For ambulatory care (physician and pharmaceutical expenditures), the proﬁle
is clearly increasing with age. A noticeable upwards drift of this proﬁle between
the years 1992 and 2000 is noticeable for people aged 40 and over. While both are
increasing with age, this drift is much larger for drugs than for physician visits.
As for hospital expenditures, there is a clear increase with age of the proﬁle for
people aged 60 and over, but no upward drift is clearly noticeable. A downward
shift is even visible for people aged 30 to 59. This absence of an upward shift of
the proﬁle might may be attributed to the global budget used in France for the









































8years 1995-2000 induced a severe ﬁnancial constraint for public hospitals. However,
we need more thorough investigations to conﬁrm such an interpretation.









































8Graph 5B : Conditional pharmaceutical expenditures by age group









































84.1.3 Proﬁles by age of the participation rates
The average participation rate (proportion of health care users) by age group is
presented in graphs 6A (physician expenditures), 6B (pharmaceutical expenditures)
and 6C (hospital expenditures). We ﬁrst notice the high proportion of non-users
(80% to 90%) as concerns hospital care. The proportion of non-users is much smaller
for ambulatory care and drugs (10% to 30%) but not negligible.
The proﬁle is increasing : the participation rate is increasing with age.
As for ambulatory care, a slight upwards drift is visible for people aged 70 and
older (graphs 6A and 6B). However, the most noticeable upwards drift is the one visi-
ble for people aged 39 and younger. An explanation of this phenomenon could be the
existence of induced demand, linked to the regulation of the ambulatory care sector
in France. Indeed, physicians are paid according to a fee-for-services scheme with
exogenously ﬁxed fees, and during the period 1992-2000 the physician:population
ratio was very high and even increasing [9]. However, we also need more thorough
investigations to assess such an interpretation.
Turning to the use of hospital care, we observe an upwards drift. The use of hospital
is thus increasing between 1992 and 2000. This drift is visible for every age group
but more pronounced for the elderly.
On the whole, observing simultaneously the average conditional expenditures and
participation rate for ambulatory care, it appears that the less than 40 year-olds and
the more than 40 year-olds have behaved diﬀerently between 1992 and 2000. The
former had their participation rise and their consumption remain somewhat stable,









































8Graph 6A : Average participation rate by age group - physician expenditures


















































































84.1.4 Proﬁle by age of unconditional health care expenditures









































8Graph 7B : unconditional pharmaceutical expenditures by age group









































84.2 The inﬂuence of morbidity on the health care expendi-
tures proﬁle by age
As we can see on graph 8, morbidity increases strongly with age. The average
number of diseases, level of vital risk and level of invalidity increase with age.
Graph 8 : Average number of pathologies, vital risk and invalidity by age group, year 1992
Actually, morbidity is by far the main determinant of the health care expendi-
tures proﬁle by age group, far beyond any other explanatory factor. A simple OLS
analysis performed on untransformed data shows us that the increase in morbid-
ity with age explains the major part of the expenditures proﬁle by age. Graph 9
presents, for the year 1992, the prediction of this proﬁle obtained by the estimation
of such a model, and the respective eﬀects of the various groups of explanatory vari-
ables (a comparable graph can be obtained for the year 2000 and for other types of
expenditures). It can be seen that the level of expenditures rises strongly with age,
and that this increase is explained almost entirely by the increase in morbidity with









































8increasing proﬁle of the use of health care services with age is mainly explained by
the evolution of morbidity with age7.




















Graph 9 : Eﬀects of diﬀerent predictors of HCE (drugs, year 1992)
5 The empirical approach
Our purpose is to implement simulation techniques in order to examine the inﬂuence
of various eﬀects on the shifts in the proﬁle of health expenditures by age group.
Our empirical approach entails two steps: ﬁrstly, the speciﬁcation and estimation of
a two-equations model explaining the decision to consume and the level of expen-
diture, conditional on participation; secondly, the use of the estimates to simulate
counterfactual average levels of participation and expenditure by age group. This
second step makes it possible to identify the components of the drift observed be-
tween 1992 and 2000 in the proﬁle by age of health expenditures. More precisely, we
evaluate the impacts of changes in morbidity between 1992 and 2000 and the eﬀects
7Note : we included the variable ”grade”(grade of self-assessed health) in this purely descriptive









































8of changes in practices between 1992 and 2000, for a given level of morbidity. This
approach is implemented for each of the three components of health care expendi-
tures we focus on. In this section, we present the econometric speciﬁcations and the
principles of our predictions and simulations.
5.1 Econometric speciﬁcations
A typical feature of health expenditure data is that many individuals incur no health
costs within the period of observation. The descriptive analysis has shown the high
proportion of non-users of hospital (Graph 6C). As regards consultations and drugs,
the proportion of non-users is smaller, but not negligible (Graphs 6A and 6B). Such
a conﬁguration requires speciﬁc estimation techniques. Many papers addressed the
issue of the choice between the sample-selection model (Heckit [10]) and the two-
part model [11, 12, 13]. Monte Carlo studies implemented by Manning, Duan and
Rogers [13] show that the two-part model performs better than the sample selection
model even when the latter is the true model. However, Leung and Yu [12] have
shown that the performances of the sample selection model depend crucially on the
degree of collinearity between the inverse Mill’s ratio and the explanatory variables
of the second step equation. When there are no collinearity problems, a t-test of
the coeﬃcient of the inverse Mill’s ratio can be used to choose between the two
speciﬁcations.
As stated below, our data do not lead to serious collinearity between the inverse
Mill’s ratio and the explanatory variables of the second step equation. Therefore, we
chose to allow for the possibility of selection and used the Heckit model whenever
the inverse Mill’s ratio appeared to be signiﬁcant.
For the individual i belonging to the age group j; we denote Pij the dichotomic
variable representing participation and Cij the health care consumption, and con-








ijb + aj + u1;ij = X
0


















































ij¯ + ®j + u2;ij = X0
2;ij± + u2;ij
(2)

















Equation (1) describes the decision to use health care services and equation (2)
explains the level of consumption. If ½ = 0, the participation decision is independent
of the level of consumption and the two equations can be estimated separately (two-
part model). If, on the contrary, ½ 6= 0, we must take the sample selection process
into account, in order to obtain a consistent estimate of (2) [10].
X0
1;ij and X0
2;ij are the explanatory variables of the participation and consumption
equations (1) and (2). These explanatory variables entail M0
ij, which are related to
the morbidity indicators. Equations (1) and (2) include dummies aj and ®j related
to the age groups. In addition, equation (1) includes explanatory variables such
as family size, education level, coverage by a supplementary insurance, gender and
matrimonial status (variables W 0
ij). Equation (2) also includes explanatory variables
in addition to the morbidity indicators and age group dummies : level of earnings,
coverage by a supplementary insurance, social and occupational group and gender
(variables Z0
ij). For identiﬁcation purposes, some explanatory variables of equation
(2) are not included in equation (1) [14].
The sample selection model can be estimated by the maximum likelihood esti-
mator. However, we are interested in studying and performing simulations on the
participation behaviour as well as on the conditional consumption. Therefore, we











¾1 ); with '(:) and Φ(:) standing for the









































85.2 Predicted expenditures with the sample selection model
The decision to use health care services can be easily predicted. From the estimation







The prediction of the conditional expenditures is not so easy to derive, since we have
to deal with the retransformation problem. Indeed, among the positive expenditure
observations Cij, there is a large skew and we have to specify (2) in terms of Log(Cij).
The log transformation reduced the skewness in the dependant variable to small
values such as, for instance, -0.14 for consultations expenditures, -0.06 for drugs
and -0.77 for hospital in 2000. However, we need to predict expenditures on the
untransformed scale because decision makers do not work with log Euros. Therefore,
we have to deal with the problem of retransforming back to raw-scale expenditure
predictions.
Consider ﬁrst that ½ = 0 (this is the case for hospital expenditures). Then a




2;ij± + u2;ij (4)
In this case, one has :














Assuming a normality distribution for u2;ij leads to a simple analytical expres-
sion of
Z







ally, Duan [15] suggested to use a non parametric ”smearing estimator”, where Z
expfu2;ijgdF(u2;ij) is estimated by
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Following this deﬁnition, we can estimate:
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8When ½ 6= 0; equation (2) can be consistently estimated by applying OLS for






















) is computed from the estimation of (1) in the
ﬁrst step. In this case, we can estimate:
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However, the smearing estimator is likely to produce biased estimates when the
log-scale errors are heteroscedastic in some function of the explanatory variables.
Instead of using Duan’s estimator [15], Manning and Mullahy [17] and Mullahy [18]
suggest to use alternative procedures.
Since heteroscedasticity is likely to be introduced by the taking into account of
the inverse Mill’s ratio [19], we performed a Breusch-Pagan test to check whether
the disturbances wij of (6) were homoscedastic or not. Except for hospital expendi-
tures, most of the tests rejected the homoscedasticity hypothesis. In these cases, we












obtained by the identiﬁcation of the variance function of the error wij. For that pur-




i;j = V 0
ij µ +»ij , where
^
wi;j are the estimated















To check whether we had correctly identiﬁed the variance function of wij , we applied
the weighted least squares to (6) and performed a Breusch-Pagan test on the trans-
formed model. These tests always led not to reject the homoscedasticity hypothesis,
therefore validating the estimation (8). Notice, however, that we used expression (6)









































8whole, in the case of heteroscedasticity8, we predicted the expenditures following the
expression:
^


































w;i deﬁned by (8).
5.3 Principles of simulations














Since the computation of predictors (3) and (5), (7) or (9) involve several non-
linear functions, we cannot exhibit additive eﬀects. Instead, we use an incremental
approach.
As concerns participation (decision to use health care services), we compute or
simulate the predicted probability for the average patient of each age group j. This
is done for each expenditure component, i.e. physicians visits, drugs and hospital.
For the population observed in 1992 and behavior of 1992, the predicted proba-





















































We have chosen this approach instead of computing the average by age group
of individual predicted probabilities. This empirical strategy allows us to simulate
the eﬀects of changes in morbidity, while we hold constant the other explanatory
variables.
8In that case, we used asymptotic standard errors estimators robust to heteroscedasticity (White









































8Given the role of morbidity on the expenditure proﬁle (see section 4.2), we focus
on changes in morbidity and changes in practices, for a given morbidity.
























The incremental eﬀect of changes in morbidity between 1992 and 2000 can be
evaluated by replacing, for each age group, the average level of morbidity observed
in 1992, M092




















Finally, the incremental eﬀects of other changes in behavior and individual char-



























We follow the same principles to compute the predictions (CjP):j of the lev-
els of expenditures by age group, conditional on participation. We use the ex-









:j : More precisely, the means by age group of the explanatory variables
are computed only on the subsamples of participants, when simulating the con-
ditional expenditures. As concerns physician visits and pharmaceutical expendi-
tures our estimates gave empirical evidence of a signiﬁcant Mill’s ratio and het-









:j : On the contrary, we did
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant selection bias or heteroscedasticity for hospital and thus used
expression (5) to compute the simulations.
To sum up :
9Notice that because of the taking into account of heteroscedasticity, there are explanatory
variables (such as the morbidity indicators) and coeﬃcients subject to be changed in the term Ã
00













































:j gives the eﬀect of changes in
practices for a given morbidity.




:j gives the incremental eﬀect
of changes in morbidity (among the participants) between 1992 and 2000.




:j gives the incremental
eﬀect of other changes of behavior and individual characteristics between 1992
and 2000.
What we call changes in practices are changes in the estimated parameters of (1)
or (2) between 1992 and 2000. These changes can be linked to changes in patients’
behavior or in physicians’ behavior. They can result from technological progress,
which induces the use of innovative procedures or innovative drugs which can be
more costly. This technological progress may concern treatment of diseases speciﬁc
to the elderly. Changes in practices are also linked to the extension of prevention
protocols to old ages. For example, medical recommendations for preventing hyper-
cholestorolaemia have been recently extended to very old ages in France. In the
same way, the use of surgical treatment of cataract changed dramatically for people
aged 75-84 in France: the proportion of surgical treatment rose from 40 % to 55 %
between 1993 and 1998 [21].





¯; which measure the inﬂuence of morbidity on the participation
rate and level of expenditures. What we call ”other changes in behavior and indi-
vidual characteristics between 1992 and 2000”can also be interpreted as changes in
practices: Actually, these ”other changes”depend on changes in the variables W and








®j: However, our econometric






These changes in age-speciﬁc constants can be linked to changes in unobservable
morbidity as well as changes in practices for a given level of morbidity. In this pa-









































8given observable level of morbidity.
6 Results
The estimation of expressions (1) and (2) reveal a strong inﬂuence of the morbidity
indicators on participation and on the level of conditional comsumption, given par-
ticipation10. The number of diseases, as well as the invalidity and vital risk levels,
have large positive impacts on the use of health care services. To take an example,
in 1992, an invalidity level of 3 raises the conditional pharmaceutical consumption of
27 %. When the invalidity level is 4 or 5, the rise in the conditional pharmaceutical
consumption amounts to 52 % and 73 %. The eﬀect of a vital risk equal to 3 or 4 on
the conditional pharmaceutical consumption is 31 % or 77 %. Otherwise, we ﬁnd that
the fact of belonging to a low-income category has a negative inﬂuence on the level
of conditional consumption of ambulatory care. The lack of supplementary coverage
has a negative inﬂuence on the participation and the conditional expenditure for
each of the three components of health care services11. In general, gender is not sig-
niﬁcant for participation, but women incur signiﬁcantly higher levels of conditional
consumption. To sum up, the eﬀect of ageing on health expenditures is captured in
our speciﬁcation by morbidity indicators and age dummies. Our estimations show
that these factors have strong signiﬁcant impacts on participation and consumption
of ambulatory and hospital care.
To check for the potential collinearity problem addressed by Leung and Yu [12],
we computed, for each year and health expenditure component, the R2 of the re-
gression of the inverse Mill’s ratios ¸ij on X0
2;ij the regressors of (2). The results
obtained validate our approach in terms of sample selection model: we ﬁnd, in 1992
for instance, 0.63 for consultations, 0.74 for drugs and 0.67 for hospital12.
Table 4 in appendix B displays, for each year and health expenditure component,
10Detailed results are available on request.
11Its impact is not signiﬁcant only for participation to hospital care services.
12These values are much smaller than the R2 equal to 0.9997 obtained by Seshamani and Gray









































8the estimated coeﬃcients of the inverse Mill’s ratios as well as the p-values for
signiﬁcancy tests. We ﬁnd that the inverse Mill’s ratio is signiﬁcantly negative
for the expenditures associated with physician visits and drugs, but not signiﬁcant
for hospital care services. From a theoretical point of view, the coeﬃcient of the
inverse Mill’s ratio is equal to ½¾2, where ½ is the correlation coeﬃcient between the
disturbances of equations (1) and (2). Our results suggest that the unobservable
heterogeneity explaining participation is negatively correlated to the unobservable
heterogeneity explaining conditional consumption. This makes sense when thinking,
for instance, to risk aversion in connection to the risk of illness. This risk aversion is
likely to be a component of both disturbances u1 and u2: Our results then suggest the
following interpretation: more risk aversion induces more participation with more
preventive care. This results in less severe diseases with a smaller level of conditional
expenditures. This reasoning should not be appropriate as concerns hospital, where
participation is connected to the diagnosis of a disease. This is conﬁrmed by our
estimates, which lead to reject the signiﬁcancy of the inverse Mill’s ratio (therefore,
½ = 0).
From a methodological point of view, notice that many papers devoted to health
expenditures in connection to age defend the principle of rejecting the sample-
selection model in favour of the use of the two-part model. This is partly due to
practical reasons, since it is easier to deal with the retransformation problem within
the two-part model framework. Another explanation is that these papers focus on
hospital care services. On our data, we do not ﬁnd any empirical evidence of a sig-
niﬁcant selection process as regards the use of hospital services. On the contrary, we
ﬁnd a correlation between unobserved determinants of the participation and condi-
tional consumption of physician visits and drugs. Our results show that one should
be cautious about a general rejection of the sample selection model.
The implementation of the estimation and simulation methods described above
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8responding changes are computed, for the unconditional expenditures, in table 2.
These results show that :
² The eﬀect of changes in morbidity on health care expenditure proﬁle is always
negative
² The strongest positive eﬀect arise from the changes in practices for a given
morbidity. This drift is increasing with age, especially for ambulatory care.
Results are slightly diﬀerent as concerns ambulatory care (physician and phar-
maceutical expenditures) on one side and hospital care on the other side, and deserve
separate comments.
6.1 Ambulatory care
The descriptive analysis has shown that ambulatory care stands for 78.91% of the
level of studied health care expenditures. Its growth contributes as 76.11% to the
rise in health care expenditures between 1992 and 2000 ((14.70+6.14)/27.38, see
Table 1).
For ambulatory care, the bulk of changes are essentially due to changes in expendi-
tures conditional on participation and not to changes in participation. This appeared
clearly in graphs 5 to 7, A to C and in table 5 in the appendix.
Results clearly diﬀer for people before and beyond 40 years of age.
6.1.1 People aged 40 and over
Very small changes in participation can be observed for people aged 40 and older
(see graphs 11A and 11B), whereas a sizeable drift in the proﬁle by age can be
observed between 1992 and 2000 for conditional expenditures, and consequently for
unconditional expenditures. See for example graphs 10A, B and 12A, B.
- As concerns physician expenditures, simulations show a sizeable drift due to
changes in practices for a given level of morbidity (see graph 10A, changes from the









































8Changes in morbidity induce a downward drift of the proﬁle which partly compen-
sates the positive inﬂuence of changes in practices (see graph 10A, changes from the
proﬁle p92m92.00 to the proﬁle p92m00.00).
- Pharmaceutical expenditures rise tremendously : + 43.52% between 1992 and 2000
(see table 1). Consequently, they contribute to more than 50% to the rise in health
care expenditures between 1992 and 2000 (14.70/27.38, see Table 1). Our simula-
tions show that this growth is due to a large upward drift of the proﬁle in relation
to changes in practices and ”other changes” (see graph 10B, changes from p92b92
to p92m92.00, and from p92m00.00 to p00b00). Remind that these ”other changes”
are mainly due to changes in the age-speciﬁc constants, that we interpret as changes
in practices for a given observable level of morbidity. It is noticeable that the sum
of these two upward drifts is much more important than what was observed for
physician expenditures. This can be observed in table 2 and by comparing graphs
10A and 10B, keeping in mind that scales diﬀer. The changes in morbidity induce
a downward drift which compensates only partly this total upward drift.
To sum up, the drift due to changes in practices is much more spectacular for
pharmaceutical expenditures than for physician visits. There is thus a large in-
novation component in this observed drift. These results concern pharmaceutical
expenditures, which are responsible for more than half of the growth in total health
care expenditures. They show that the drifts are not due to changes in the be-
haviours of the elderly, but can rather be linked to the supply of new products on
the health care market.
6.1.2 People younger than 40
For people younger than 40, the only noticeable change that occurred is mostly
related to the participation rate, which is rising between 1992 and 2000. The upward
drift is not explained by changes in practices for a given level of morbidity, nor by
changes in morbidity (see graph 11A, B, changes from p92b92 to p92m92.00 and









































8behaviours. In any case, the inﬂuence on the expenditures proﬁle of these changes in
participation is negligible. Indeed, there is no noticeable diﬀerence for young people
between graphs 10A, B and 12A, B.
6.2 Hospital care
As stated above, hospital care stands for 21.08% of the health care expenditures
level. Its growth contributes as 23.89% to the rise in health care expenditures be-
tween 1992 and 2000 (6.54/27.38, see Table 1).
What is observed for hospital care constrasts strongly with ambulatory care. In-
deed, the bulk of changes is now due to a drift in the participation proﬁle by age
(see graph 6C and table 5 in the appendix). The drift in participation rates is ob-
served for every age group, but appears to be increasing with age (see graph 11C).
Our simulation shows that this upward drift is entirely due to changes in practices
for a given level of morbidity (see graph 11C, changes from p92b92 to p92m92.00).
As for unconditional expenditures (Table 2), we ﬁnd again the negative eﬀect of
changes in morbidity for people aged 40 and over, as well as the positive eﬀect of
changes in practices for a given morbidity. One observes for the last age group a
tremendous change in practices for a given morbidity : + 179.27% (see table 2). This
jump is only visible on graph 12C (unconditional expenditures), since it is only due
to a change in participation behaviour, which is entirely due to changes in practices
for a given level of morbidity (graph 11C). To sum up, there is not much of a proﬁle
as regards hospital expenditures, but rather a jump for the last age group, which is
only due to changes in practices (more participation) for a given level of morbidity.
This result seems to be close to results of studies which focus on the inﬂuence of
time to death on health care expenditures [2, 3, 1]. Indeed, the dependent variables
of these studies is reduced to hospital care as concerns Seshamani & Gray [2, 3]
or mainly inﬂuenced by hospital expenditures as concerns Zweifel, Felder & Meiers
[1]. However, the jump we observe is only due to changes in participation, not


















































































8Graph 10A : Simulated proﬁles : physician expenditures (conditional)









































8Graph 10C : Simulated proﬁles : hospital expenditures (conditional)
p92b92 : population of 1992, behaviors of 1992
p92m92.00 : population of 1992, morbidity of 1992, practices of 2000 (changes in practices for a
given morbidity)
p92m00.00 : population of 1992, morbidity of 2000, practices of 2000 (changes in morbidity)









































8Graph 11A : Simulated proﬁles : participation to physician expenditures









































8Graph 11C : Simulated proﬁles : participation to hospital expenditures
p92b92 : population of 1992, behaviors of 1992
p92m92.00 : population of 1992, morbidity of 1992, practices of 2000 (changes in practices for a
given morbidity)
p92m00.00 : population of 1992, morbidity of 2000, practices of 2000 (changes in morbidity)









































8Graph 12A : Simulated proﬁles : physician expenditures (unconditional)









































8Graph 12C : Simulated proﬁles : hospital expenditures (unconditional)
p92b92 : population of 1992, behaviors of 1992
p92m92.00 : population of 1992, morbidity of 1992, practices of 2000 (changes in practices for a
given morbidity)
p92m00.00 : population of 1992, morbidity of 2000, practices of 2000 (changes in morbidity)









































8Phys. exp. Pharm. exp. Hosp. exp.
Total Pract. Chg Morbid. Chg Total Pract. Chg Morbid. Chg Total Pract. Chg Morbid. Chg
0 6,10 0,82 1,24 69,51 0,87 2,07 -26,70 5,96 -2,61
2 12,46 6,36 -8,48 35,34 0,19 -4,77 49,73 27,42 -0,53
10 10,47 12,83 -8,25 21,15 3,45 -6,20 19,91 58,22 -0,35
20 9,56 21,20 -6,12 32,24 18,58 -5,96 54,63 48,41 3,78
30 18,37 20,91 -5,78 39,35 22,36 -6,59 5,62 50,10 5,84
40 3,96 19,58 -7,55 20,03 28,57 -19,80 -7,57 57,20 -3,05
50 8,84 23,14 -11,54 20,23 34,87 -28,01 65,55 60,34 -4,51
60 12,51 21,60 -6,61 54,90 25,04 -18,60 118,15 68,25 0,18
70 19,29 15,81 -3,83 59,15 13,94 -14,80 100,54 179,27 -17,38










































87 Comparing demographic eﬀects and changes in
practices
On table 3, we applied the predictions and simulations derived above to the structure by age of the
French population. This allows us to evaluate, for the past period 1992-2000, the relative eﬀects
of demographic changes and proﬁle drifts. In addition, we can evaluate the components of changes
in proﬁle drifts.
We ﬁnd again the negative eﬀect of changes in morbidity. The rise in health care expenditures
due to demographic changes appears to be very small, in comparison with the eﬀects of changes in
practices. Concentrating on the aggregate expenditure and taking the restrictive deﬁnition of the
changes in practices, we ﬁnd that the impact of changes in practices is 4.6 larger than the rise in
health care expenditures due to demographic changes. Considering a broader deﬁnition (including
other changes), we ﬁnd that the impact of changes in practices is 6.4 larger than the rise in health
care expenditures due to demographic changes.
Variation 1992-2000 (%) Physicians Pharmac. Hospital Aggregate
Total demographic change 5,37 8,30 5,85 6,58
of which :
part of structural change 2,41 5,26 2,88 3,58
part of growing size of population 2,96 3,04 2,97 3,00
Changes in practices for a given morbidity 18,56 20,84 86,92 30,22
Changes in morbidity -7,06 -16,61 -6,44 -10,39
Other changes 1,68 41,86 -12,25 11,96
Residual -0,49 0,42 -11,64 0,87
Total variation 1992-2000 (%) 18,06 54,81 62,44 39,24
Table 3 : Simulations at the macro level
8 Conclusion
Our results show that ageing is likely to explain only partially the rise in health care expenditures.
The main explanation is linked to technological progress and better access to innovations for the
elderly, through extended recommendations. This explanation has not to do with ageing per se,









































8changes in practices for the elderly are not linked to changes in participation behaviour but to
changes in conditional consumption. The drift due to changes in practices is much more spectacular
for pharmaceutical expenditures than for physician visits, suggesting a large innovation component.
These results reveal that the drifts we observe are not due to changes in the behaviours of the elderly,
but can rather be linked to the introduction of new products on the health care market.
Our data allow us to split the health care expenditures into 3 components. Therefore, our study is
not restricted to hospital expenditures, but also considers ambulatory care. The taking into account
of participation in our model allows us to isolate changes that can be due to patients’ initiative.
Furthermore, the possibility we had to consider separately pharmaceutical expenditures makes it
possible to identify that the upward drift in drug consumption is mainly due to the supply of new
products, i.e. to technological progress. In comparison with studies concentrated on time to death,
another advantage of our database is that it provides information about morbidity indicators as
well as about vital risk, which is an indicator of probability of death. This allows us : (i) to give
evidence of the fact that the health of the elderly is improving, which leads to savings in health
care spending, (ii) to evaluate the savings due to changes in morbidity.
The availability of morbidity indicators for every observed individual (and not restricted only to
people close to death) allows us to estimate expenditure proﬁles for all age groups. This makes it
possible to provide evidence of the fact that the upward drift linked to changes in practices, which
is mainly due to technological progress is increasing with age.
9 Appendices
9.1 Appendix A





² Size of household
² Level of education
² Absence of complementary coverage









































8² Level of invalidity




² Social and occupational group
² Household net income
² Absence of complementary coverage
² Number of pathologies
² Level of invalidity
² Level of vital risk
9.3 The age groups
² 0 : 0-1 years old
² 2 : 2-9 years old
² 10 : 10-19 years old
² 20 : 20-29 years old
² 30 : 30-39 years old
² 40 : 40-49 years old
² 50 : 50-59 years old
² 60 : 60-69 years old
² 70 : 70 years old and older
9.4 The indicators of morbidity
The level of invalidity :
² 0 : no diﬃculty
² 1 : very small level of diﬃculty









































8² 3 : experiences diﬃculties but lives normally
² 4 : must diminish his/her domestic or professional activity
² 5 : diminished activity
² 6 : no domestic autonomy
² 7 : conﬁned to bed
The vital risk :
² 0 : level zero of vital risk
² 1 : very low negative prognosis
² 2 : low negative prognosis
² 3 : possible risk
² 4 : probably negative prognosis
² 5 : surely negative prognosis
The level of vital risk (probability of death within the following 5 years) is elaborated by the IRDES
physicians who recode the survey.
The number of pathologies is calculated from the list of pathologies declared by the respondent,




² 1 : married or living in a couple
² 2 : divorced or separate
² 3 : widow / widower
² 4 : single
Level of education :
² 1 : does not go to school, never went to school, other
² 2 : kindergarten to primary school
² 3 : junior high school









































8² 5 : higher education
Social and occupational group (INSEE classiﬁcation) :
² 1 : agrarians
² 2 : independent workers
² 3 : intellectual professions
² 4 : intermediary professions
² 5 : clerks
² 6 : qualiﬁed workers
² 7 : non-qualiﬁed workers
Household net income :
² 1 : belonging to the 20% lowest incomes
² 2 : belonging to the middle 40% of the income distribution
² 3 : belonging to the 20% highest incomes
10 Appendix B
Physician (1) Pharma (1) Hospital
lambda p-value lambda p-value lambda p-value
1992 -0,891 0,00043 -0,681 0,0067 -0,404 0,149
2000 -0,804 0,00896 -0,687 0,0094 -0,527 0,1809
Table 4 : Estimated coeﬃcients of the inverse Mill’s ratio











































Physician Changes in participation Changes in conditional HCE Total : changes in unconditional HCE
0 6,12 -0,02 6,10
2 9,06 3,11 12,46
10 6,66 3,57 10,47
20 12,63 -2,73 9,56
30 12,85 4,89 18,37
40 2,30 1,62 3,96
50 0,22 8,60 8,84
60 1,07 11,32 12,51
70 3,29 15,49 19,29
Pharma. Changes in participation Changes in conditional HCE Total : changes in unconditional HCE
0 6,12 59,74 69,51
2 7,88 25,45 35,34
10 13,87 6,39 21,15
20 13,86 16,14 32,24
30 14,86 21,31 39,35
40 8,92 10,20 20,03
50 1,06 18,97 20,23
60 1,62 52,43 54,90
70 3,91 53,17 59,15
Hospital Changes in participation Changes in conditional HCE Total : changes in unconditional HCE
0 53,43 -52,23 -26,70
2 80,38 -16,99 49,73
10 73,56 -30,91 19,91
20 51,58 2,01 54,63
30 53,13 -31,02 5,62
40 60,64 -42,46 -7,57
50 104,96 -19,23 65,55
60 112,21 2,80 118,15
70 90,97 5,01 100,54
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